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The Mexican War of 1846 to 1848, forgotten by most Americans, arose out of a complex
situation that many different authors have attempted to explain. The results were plain: the United
States so successfully carried out the war against Mexico that over ten degrees of latitude were
added to the former country at the expense of the latter. 1 Mexico lost one-half of her territory.
Many reasons have been given for the conflict. Some historians blame the Southern slaveholding
interests for seeking to add more slave land to the United States. Others simply cite provocations by
Mexico: her violations of treaties, abuses of U.S. citizens in her territory, mistreatment of the
Texans after they gained their independence from Mexico, and finally, her declaration of war (albeit
a defensive one) against the United States. President Polk's expansionist actions, some blame; the
Eastern United States commercial interests, others impute. The ubiquitous concept of "Manifest
Destiny" pervades the historiography of the Mexican War as a source of conflict. And infrequently
mentioned is the significance of political instability in Mexico in the period from Mexico's
independence in 1821 until the war. Because these varying theories do not fall neatly into groups,
they will be examined chronologically.

19TH CENTURY AMERICAN AND OTHER NON-MEXICAN HISTORIANS
Nathan Covington Brooks
In A Complete History of the Mexican War: its causes, conduct, and consequences:
comprising an account of the various military and naval operations, from its commencement to the
treaty of peace, Nathan Covington Brooks claims that the war was an act of aggression that the
President of the United States conducted without regard to the wishes of the Congress. Mexico did
violate the April 5, 1831, commercial treaty with the United States when she impounded a vessel
Nathan Covington Brooks, A Complete History of the Mexican War: its causes, conduct, and consequences:
comprising an account of the various military and naval operations, from its commencement to the treaty of peace
(Chicago: the Rio Grande Press Inc., 1965), 523.
1

from Maine and incorporated it into the Mexican navy, and she did declare war first; but since the
declaration of war was of a defensive nature, Mexico did not act upon it. The independence of
Texas and later its annexation into the United States brought on the hostilities only in that Polk
ordered troops into the territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers that Texas claimed upon
her independence. The boundary of Texas was the Nueces, and even though Texas made a claim to
the land between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, the claim was not supported by occupation or the
law; it was only made in writing. Polk, ". . .by an assumption of power not warranted in the
Constitution, and without the knowledge and consent of Congress, order[ed] the American army
into the territory of Mexico and precipitat[ed] the country into war."2 Mexicans considered this act
to be the commencement of war. The short period between the annexation of Texas and the
outbreak of war allowed no time to pass for Mexican tempers to cool, further fueling the crisis and
possibly causing the fighting. Brooks asks, ". . .who can imagine what the end would have been if,
in the dispute about Oregon, the President, without consulting Congress, had ordered the American
army to the boundary as claimed in 54 degrees 40 minutes?"3

William Jay
Perhaps the most unorthodox source considered here is A Review of the Causes and
Consequences of the Mexican War by William Jay, first published in 1849. Jay cites the extension
of slavery as the primary and, perhaps, only motivation for the initiation of the conflict. Slavery was
geographically confined to the southeastern United States before the acquisition of any Mexican
territory because it was not allowed by the free Northern states or the Mexican lands to the west.
The grievances began for the Americans when the Mexican government completely abolished
slavery in her territories in 1829. Because the Mexican government was too weak to expel the
numerous slaveholding Americans in Texas, the Texans sought annexation to the United States as a
slaveholding state. A wave of attempts to purchase Texas ensued. Some newspapers estimated that
2
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up to nine new slaveholding states could be added to the union if this were accomplished. Slavery
needed land to survive: dense populations created rebellions.
The purchasing of Texas a failure, slaveholders encouraged the Texans to end their union
with the Mexican government so that annexation could be pursued. Independence was gained with
the aid of many U.S. citizens enlisted into the Texan armies. Unfortunately for slaveholders,
annexation was opposed by many in Congress; this barrier would be removed if Mexico began the
hostilities. The U.S. could then take the land through the right of conquest. "From this time, the
policy of the administration was to force Mexico into war."4
Many claims were made by American citizens against the Mexican government, but upon
examination of the abuses supposedly committed by Mexico, Jay writes that no claims were justly
made. Even the ones that were legitimate abuses were not national issues, being committed by
lower officials who occasionally took too much power into their own hands; no national tension
should have begun over these claims. The threats that Mexico made about recapturing Texas were
idle threats, and the political instability in that nation left them completely incapable of carrying any
of them out. Also, the boundary dispute that allowed President Polk to declare that American blood
had been spilled on American soil was a result of the Texan legislature's extreme claims: Texas at
one point claimed land as far as Oregon. No Texan settlements were in the disputed area between
the Rio Grande and the Nueces River. Even the clash of arms over the above boundary dispute was
not enough to begin a war, as the British had previously seized two American ships, killing
members of their crews and damaging the ships, with no talk of war over it.
Interestingly, Polk claimed Mexican territory with the same insistence with which he
claimed British Oregon, but the "clear and unquestionable" title to Oregon ended in a peaceful
relinquishment of five degrees and forty minutes of territory; in contrast, the claims to Mexican
lands led to a war. Jay asserts that slavery would never have occurred in Oregon, but the new
southern lands had ripe conditions for the introduction of slaves. From start to finish slavery
William Jay, A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War (Freeport, New York: Books for
Libraries Press, 1970), 32.
4

determined the prosecution of the Mexican War and the provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.5

20TH CENTURY AMERICAN AND OTHER NON-MEXICAN HISTORIANS
Karl Jack Bauer
In Bauer's book The Mexican War, 1846-1848, he finds Manifest Destiny and the
accompanying notion of the superiority of American democratic egalitarianism to be the underlying
principles behind the events that caused the Mexican War. These concepts entailed the vision of a
United States expanded to the west coast of the continent in spite of the intervening Mexican
territory. ". . .It was clearly America's obligation to overspread the continent from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. Only under the American Way could the trackless wilderness be brought into blossom."6
The key events that brought about the hostilities were the Texan Revolution and the claims
held against the Mexican government by American citizens. The Texans won their independence
on April 21, 1836, and there was some desire on the part of the United States government to annex
Texas, but the opposition in Congress was too great to make an attempt until 1844. Then, President
Tyler and his Secretaries of State, Abel P. Upshur and John C. Calhoun, were able to achieve the
annexation of Texas. To the Mexicans, who never accepted the independence of Texas, this was in
effect the annexation of their territory. They considered the loss of Texas a blow to their national
honor. The dispute surrounding the border of Texas only served to inflame the tension between
Mexico and the United States.
The adjustment of claims was the other major area of friction between the two nations.
Mexico did not pay the $2,026,149 in claims she had agreed to pay in 1843, and to many
Americans, Mexico should have given parts of her territory to repay the debt she could not pay
monetarily.7 Repayment with territory was totally unacceptable to the Mexicans, who increasingly
5
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came to oppose any settlement with the United States, much less one involving the loss of land.
The United States and Mexico went to war in 1846 because Mexico could not give up her
territory without a military defeat that eliminated her ability to resist. The United States, influenced
by the necessity of expansion to the Pacific under the concept of Manifest Destiny, was unable to
negotiate the peaceful transfer of the Mexican lands. In Bauer's opinion, "if America ever fought an
unavoidable war, it was the conflict with Mexico over the delineation of the common boundary."8

Samuel Flagg Bemis
In A Diplomatic History of the United States the author defends Polk's actions by saying that
"the United States was not responsible, nation to nation, for the settlement of Texas, nor for the
outbreak of the Texan revolution."9 Both of the above events were popular, justifiable movements,
as was the independence of Texas; Mexico itself recognized it in 1845 when she offered to agree to
a treaty with the Republic of Texas as long as the latter would never become a member of the
United States. When Mexico informed the U.S. that annexation would be taken as a declaration of
war, Polk sent troops to Texas to defend it and positioned the navy off the Mexican coasts. He
avoided the policy of inciting the Texans to make war on Mexico, his primary goal being a peaceful
settlement of both the boundary dispute and of the claims made against Mexico.
The conflict came when Polk misread the signals from the Mexican government about
resolving the differences. The Mexicans under the Herrera government said they would accept a
commissioner from the United States to negotiate a settlement; however, Polk appointed John
Slidell as minister plenipotentiary to the Mexican government. Herrera could not accept a full
minister from the U.S., as this would have been a sign of capitulation to the Americans and would
have brought about the loss of his political power. When indeed he was later deposed by General
Paredes, the new government continued to reject Slidell, fearing that to acknowledge Slidell as a
minister would lead to the government's overthrow. In addition, since neither government was
8
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Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1955), 232.

afraid of the United States, there was not much necessity for recognizing Slidell. This was an
imprudent policy on the part of the Mexicans, for when it became apparent to Polk that the Mexican
government would not negotiate with Slidell, ". . .he disposed the military forces of the United
States in a challenging way. Only the fact that the Oregon question was still pending seems to have
prevented Polk from sending a war message to Congress immediately upon learning of the failure of
Slidell's mission."10
Polk could have kept the peace even then by not sending the army across the Nueces, but as
his efforts to resolve the problems diplomatically had failed, he ordered the army to occupy the
eastern bank of the Rio Grande, thereby preventing the Mexican military from gaining an
advantageous position in the area. Once the Mexicans had declared a defensive war and a brief fight
between Taylor's and Arista's army had occurred, Polk declared war as a reaction to Mexico's
provocation. He could have avoided the war, but as Bemis indicates ". . . [he] allowed Mexico to
begin [it], and this, too, without any dishonorable action on his part to precipitate it."11
Much territory was added to the United States as a result of the Mexican War. But the new
territories inflamed the slavery controversy once again, and their acquisition became the first in a
ten-year series of events that led to Southern secession and Civil War. In spite of the immense cost
of the latter war, Bemis supports the actions taken by Polk, saying that ". . .it would be well-nigh
impossible today to find a citizen of the United States who would desire to undo President Polk's
diplomacy, President Polk's war, and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. . . ."12

Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk
Connor and Faulk find the reaction of Mexico against the annexation of Texas by the United
States as the cause of war in North America Divided: the Mexican War, 1846-1848. Basically, the
war had its roots in the actions of Stephen F. Austin, who petitioned the Mexican Congress to allow
10
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him to settle American colonists in Texas. He was allowed to do so under the auspices of the
Mexican Federal Colonization Law. The liberal Constitution of 1824 being in effect, the authorities
thought it best to encourage colonization to the frontier areas of Mexico. For this reason, Mexico
granted land quite freely to colonists; this liberality ". . .quite definitely provided the impetus for an
American migration to Mexico. . . ."13 As Connor and Faulk indicate, the Americans settled
Mexican northern provinces to get free land and live in a democracy.
However, Mexico did not continue the federal government that was in power when the
colonists came into Texas. A shift in regimes ushered in a Centralist government which denied
Texans their local autonomy and prompted the start of the Texan Revolution on October 2, 1835.
This Revolution was not a rebellion against Mexico but against the Centralist, Santa Anna-led
dictatorship that revoked federalism and abrogated the Constitution.14 When the United States
annexed Texas, a surge of nationalism sprung up in Mexico.

Although some other factors

contributed to the outbreak of war (such as the Centralist government's unwillingness to pay on any
U.S. claims made against the previous Federalist government, and two military intrusions made by
Santa Anna into independent Texas by 1842), it was the annexation of Texas that brought about the
war. "There can be no question but that the annexation of Texas precipitated a reaction among
patriotic zealots in Mexico which produced war-- California, Polk, Manifest Destiny, claims,
Nueces boundary notwithstanding."15 General Paredes, taking advantage of this patriotic fervor,
used it as a tool to gain power by overthrowing the Herrera government and then ordering Mexican
troops into combat (and thus beginning the war).16

William E. Dodd
Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk, North America Divided: the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 9.
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William E. Dodd in an article that appeared in the Journal of the Illinois State Historical
Society, "The West and the War with Mexico," cites Western and Southern aggression as the
primary forces that led to the Mexican War. James K. Polk, a sectional President from the West,
defeated Henry Clay on a platform to annex Texas and Oregon for the United States. His candidacy
was engineered by the capable Robert James Walker of Mississippi, who had widely publicized the
Texas and Oregon plan. Polk remained loyal to his platform once in office, and immediately began
hostilities with Mexico to annex territory. Slavery was not a part of this issue, as the goal of the
West was to add more states to the union, thereby increasing its stability (a principle postulated by
Thomas Jefferson) and extending its dominion over all of North America. The Western interests
ruled the White House for four years and were responsible for the Mexican War.17

John S. D. Eisenhower
John S. D. Eisenhower in So Far From God proposes that the war was provoked primarily
by American policies, although both nations were responsible. Mexico was responsible for several
aggravations. Santa Anna, the Mexican dictator in and out of power in the period preceding the war,
removed the liberal Mexican constitution and in doing so angered the Texans by taking away their
sovereignty.

The most offensive measures were the taking away of Texan self-government,

establishing voting requirements that let only a few vote, and enforcing the abolition of slavery.
Also, Santa Anna fought against the Texan rebels during their struggle for independence and was
determined to handle them through terrorization. Until he was deposed in 1844, he continued
border fighting with the independent Texans, inflaming American hostility toward the Mexican
government and creating a great deal of sympathy for the new Texan republic. And because no
Mexican politician could recognize Texan independence and remain in office, diplomatic relations
were broken with the United States.
The United States, sympathetic to the Texans in their
William E. Dodd, "The West and the War with Mexico," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 5 (July
1912), reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 39-46 passim.
17

struggle with the Mexicans, sought to annex the territory and gain it as a state. It was not necessary
to engineer public opinion against the Mexicans-- the border terrorization carried on by Santa
Anna's regime had polarized the American people against Mexico. The American government
remained neutral until Texan statehood, but the people did not, liberally supplying the Texans with
manpower and munitions. After Texas was accepted as a state in June of 1845, an army under
Zachary Taylor was sent to the area for "defense," a reaction (on the surface) to the many Mexican
wrongs against Americans.

After taking the Mexican town of Corpus Christi, and after the

American minister to Mexico, John Slidell, was rejected by their government, Polk issued his
declaration of war. This declaration not only served to determine relations with Mexico, but it
possibly settled the dispute with Great Britain over the Oregon Territory: the British were eager to
settle once they saw that the United States was serious in its dealings with Mexico. Whether this
was an intended effect or not is a question in itself: Mexico could have been the scapegoat for
solving the Oregon question as well as a ready outlet to feed the desire for more land in the United
States. Mexico was a victim of Manifest Destiny: her northern territories were in the way of the
westward expansion, and she was unable, both as a result of corruption and of her devastating war
for independence, to control them adequately.
The American people wholeheartedly supported the war, at least for the first year, until the
casualty reports began to make themselves known. The American people gave much support to the
Texans both before and after Texan independence, and this continued into the war itself, when many
volunteers signed up to fight alongside the regular army. The Mexican mistreatment of Americans
angered them: Mexico deserved to be defeated. The Mexican people, on the other hand, had a very
low morale throughout the conflict; their leaders, especially Santa Anna, had primarily their own
interests at heart, not those of the Mexican people, and all knew it. Mexican psychology worked to
create the feeling that the people ". . .were being punished for the ambition and stupidity of their
leaders. The Yankees were merely the agents of evil, sent to Mexico to chastise her."18 Although
John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: the U.S. war with Mexico, 1846-1848 (New York: Random House,
1989), 80.
18

many hated the Americans, most swallowed their pride and dejectedly accepted the events as they
came.
After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the American public was elated, and the primary
debate was not related to guilt over the wartime annexation of so much territory but to the leniency
of the Nicholas Trist treaty. Some even recommended the annexation of the entire country of
Mexico. The Mexicans, satisfied that they had tried to fight to save their territory, were not a
defeated nation. They had lost many lives and much land, but at least their honor was defended and
they had been compensated monetarily with $15 million for the lost territory. The treaty was an
acceptable way to rid their country of the Yankees.19

John D. P. Fuller
John D. P. Fuller refutes Jay's slave-conspiracy thesis in his essay entitled "The Slavery
Question and the Movement to Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848." He proposes that at the beginning of
the Mexican War, the prevalent belief was that territory acquired from Mexico would enter the
union with slavery, but after sectional controversies flared up, most Southerners came out in
opposition to the acquisition of new territory. Many of those who favored annexation of Mexican
lands were slaveholders, but these were primarily in the Southwest and were motivated by Manifest
Destiny more than the extension of slavery. The movement against annexation really was not based
on the slavery question but on ". . .the partisan opposition of Whigs to Democratic measures" and
New England's diminishing power as the nation grew.20
The question of slavery in any lands taken from Mexico was a contrary force to expansion
until it became apparent that slavery would not be taken into Mexican territory and therefore was
not a great concern. Almost everyone was opposed to expansion at the expense of the Union, and
the sectionalism inflamed by the controversy put a damper on all proposals to acquire new land. But
19
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(New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1963), 30.
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it was gradually realized that the Mexican people were opposed to slavery and that the land was
unsuitable for its propagation, and therefore territory taken from it would be free territory upon entry
into the Union. Such an expanse of free land would not only block the spread of slavery but would
greatly increase the power of the free states over the slave states. It is here that the South,
particularly the Southeast, came out in solid opposition to the acquisition of northern Mexico. Led
by Senator John C. Calhoun, the position of the anti-annexation forces was rooted in two main
beliefs: that annexation would greatly inflame sectionalism at the expense of the Union, and that the
power of the South would be greatly diminished by the annexation of Mexican territory. By the end
of the war, two "conspiracies" were seen developing: an anti-slavery drive to annex the entire nation
of Mexico, supported by slaveholding Westerners, and a pro-slavery movement not to annex.
Calhoun and the latter movement deserve ". . .not a little credit . . .for the fact that Mexico is to-day
an independent nation,"21 for without their solid opposition to annexation the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo might not have been accepted.22

Norman A. Graebner
Norman A. Graebner offers a challenge to the Manifest Destiny thesis in his work Empire
on the Pacific. Manifest Destiny is an expanding, undirected concept that does not imply definite
geographical goals; it cannot explain why certain areas, especially California and Oregon, were
singled out as goals for American annexation. Graebner argues that the expansionist policies that
led to the Mexican War were carried out in a very defined manner amidst popular opposition, not in
an amorphous, undirected popular expansion. These policies were bent on securing the wealth and
commerce of the Pacific Coast for the United States. Popular expansionism ended with Texas; only
there was there sufficient American population to claim the territory in the name of westward
expansion.
Americans had long known of the great commercial potential of the Pacific Coast, especially
21
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of the excellent natural harbors of Puget Sound, San Fransisco, San Diego, and the Strait of Juan de
Fuca. "It was the Pacific Ocean that determined the territorial goals of all American Presidents from
John Quincy Adams to Polk."23 After the annexation of Texas, these ports became the main
objectives of Polk's policies. The commercial interests looked beyond the western edge of the
continent to the commerce of the Far East. The Mexican War provided the means of obtaining
these ports, and many volunteers from the western states fought knowing that their agricultural
produce could be sold on the Pacific Coast through overland routes. Manifest Destiny was not
responsible for the War; the conflict occurred when peaceful policies failed to annex the Pacific
Coast. Polk's expansionism was geared toward the single goal of a Pacific Coast commercial
empire.24

D. E. Livingston-Little
As the editor of Thomas Tennery's war diary, Livingston-Little sees the admission of Texas
into the Union as the event touching off the Mexican War. Many other factors contributed to the
commencement of hostilities, however. The war had its roots in the policy of Mexico to offer
generous tracts of land to settlers, mostly American, because of the unpopulated nature of her
frontier. These settlers were given some local autonomy under the federal Constitution of 1824, and
they participated in the government in spite of having to become Roman Catholic citizens of
Mexico and accept the prohibition of slavery. But in 1833 when Mexico adopted a Centralist
Constitution that ended local autonomy, the Texans began a revolution to get free. They won this
revolution and their independence, and although Santa Anna recognized it in a treaty, later
Presidents of Mexico denied its legitimacy.
Other factors for Livingston-Little that led to war were the difficulty the U.S. had in settling
claims made against the Mexican government by Americans; numerous Mexican violations of the
Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: a study in American Continental Expansion (New York: the Ronald
Press Company, 1955), vi.
23
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1831 commercial treaty between Mexico and the U.S. (including barring aliens from settling in
Mexico's frontier areas, detaining Americans in California in 1840, and ending all trade between the
two nations in 1843); and the breaking off of diplomatic relations by Juán Almonte, the Mexican
minister to the U.S., when Texas was admitted into the Union. In short, Mexico was almost totally
responsible for the War. The Paredes government that came into power in December 1845 ". .
.vowed to defend Texas to the Sabine River. At this point it is sufficient to add only that for the
next two years Polk never gave up trying to settle the conflict through diplomatic means."25

Glenn W. Price
Glenn W. Price in the Origins of the War with Mexico states that the war was a result of
American expansionist policy when policy itself failed in achieving the annexation of Texas. When
war did come, Americans had to justify it as a defensive war because Western Christendom has no
provision to justify aggressive violence. Mexico's atrocities were used to justify the conflict: these
included her failure to pay on claims made against the Mexican government; the insulting attitude
taken by her in dealings with the U.S. government; and her proposals to reoccupy Texas.
From 1825 to 1845, when Americans held out the hope that parts of Mexico, most notably
Texas, could be purchased from the Mexican government, the policy towards Mexico was geared
toward that end. Numerous representatives were sent to the Mexican government with money to
purchase lands, bribe governmental officials, or somehow to compensate the Mexicans in exchange
for different territories. By 1840 it became evident that this sort of diplomacy would not be
successful. But it represented the attitude held toward Mexicans by Americans: since the Mexicans
were seen as being incapable of self-government, Americans carried the notion that liberty could be
imposed upon them by the United States if they did not cooperate. Therefore, in dealings with the
independent Texan republic the possibility of war to aid them was never very far from the minds of
the people of the United States.
Thomas D. Tennery, The Mexican War Diary of Thomas D. Tennery ed. by D. E. Livingston-Little (Norman,
Oklahoma: the University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), ix-xv passim.
25

Once diplomacy had failed, two conspiracies were organized to gain Mexican territory: one,
engineered by the U.S. Consul to Texas Duff Green, aimed not only to add Texas and California to
the United States but also other northern provinces of Mexico through the Texan government's
establishment of the Del Norte Company. Private corporations would carry out the conquest of twothirds of Mexican lands, which would then be annexed along with Texas. Although this scheme
was disavowed and Green apparently had acted on his own, he was not at odds with the thinking of
the day. The other conspiracy, sending Commodore Robert Stockton to the Republic of Texas not
only to read but also to manipulate public opinion there into hostility against Mexico, had
governmental sponsorship from President James K. Polk. The latter policy was at least effective to
a degree, for Texan support was quickly won. This final conspiracy would not gain the territory for
the U.S., but it paved the way for war with Mexico. Soon afterwards the army under Taylor was
sent to defend Texas against Mexican and Indian invasion, and the clash of arms in the vague
boundary area between Texas and Mexico on April 25, 1846, allowed Polk to cry that American
blood had been shed on American soil. Polk had deliberately ordered the army to move on Mexican
settlements north of the Rio Grande in primarily Mexican-settled territory to provoke war, which
was then formally declared. The first act of war, however, was committed by the United States two
weeks earlier on April 12, 1846, when it blockaded the Rio Grande.
The legacy of the Mexican War for Price was the swelling of American pride and selfjustification joined by a failing to recognize the Mexicans as a nation. With the acceptance of
Manifest Destiny, the Turnerian frontier thesis, and the Monroe Doctrine, the war was not viewed as
an international conflict but as a domestic dispute. When political intrigues failed, war was the
solution, and this method carried into future policies. To Polk and many other Americans, the
Mexicans brought the war upon themselves through their atrocities.26

Otis A. Singletary
Glenn W. Price, Origins of the War with Mexico: the Polk-Stockton intrigue (Austin, Texas: the University of Texas
Press, 1967), 3-48, 105-130, 139-172 passim.
26

Otis A. Singletary in The Mexican War writes that although the annexation of Texas was the
event that touched off the Mexican War, it was only the proverbial straw that broke the camel's
back: both sides had ample reasons for dispute, and talk of war had circulated even prior to
annexation. The Mexicans were the resentful victims of Manifest Destiny who inevitably came into
conflict with the United States because of the latter's desire for westward expansion. The Mexicans
had goaded the Americans into hostility, however. Santa Anna shot prisoners of war during the
Texan Revolution, revoking the assurances of an inferior officer that the captured Texans would be
treated as prisoners. The above incident, disrespect for the bodies left at the Alamo, and the
Mexican war cry of "Exterminate to the Sabine"27 during the Texan campaign had outraged many
Americans. Mexican border raids on Texas kept these memories fresh. And finally, Singletary
makes one of the few references to the extreme instability of the Mexican government, claiming that
it prevented any diplomatic intercourse over the Texan issue; this lack of diplomacy was the key
factor that led to war.
Socially, Americans saw the Mexicans as their inferiors and held a deep resentment for
them. This was especially strong among the Texans, but was spread to a lesser degree throughout
the population. Singletary says that "the intensity of [this feeling of resentment] would be difficult
to describe."28 Mexican resentment grew out of the expansionism to which they fell victim.29

Justin H. Smith
Justin H. Smith in The War With Mexico sees the Mexican desire for war with the United
States as being the force that brought about the Mexican War. The Mexicans as a people hated the
Americans; they feared the gradual annexation of the entirety of Mexico, the U.S. democratic
influence, and Protestantism. All of these feelings were based on racism. This racism, fueled by the
almost complete cultural dissimilarity between the two peoples, fostered the assumption that
27
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Americans were less than men.
Aside from the racial prejudice against Americans, many other factors led to the desire for
war. Mexicans perceived that the Americans feared war with them to the point of preventing
decisive action. Many Americans saw the war as unjust, and they gave support to this idea; the
dissenters would provide internal political opposition. And the U.S. military was not seen as
capable of carrying out the conflict. It lacked supplies, men, generals, and ships that would be
necessary to defeat Mexico at such great distances from supply bases. The U.S. Navy would be
subject to damaging Mexican privateer raids, and it needed many ships to effect a blockade, which
would in fact benefit Mexico by protecting its industries.
In contrast, the Mexican army was held in high acclaim. The troops were seasoned from
constant revolutions, and their leadership was capable. They could fight a defensive war, putting the
burden of supplying a sizable army over vast deserts, high mountains, and other inhospitable terrain
upon Washington, while the Mexicans could strike at any time. The United States would have to
bear the cost of the war, which it could not do because of a lack of credit and resistance to high war
taxes.
The Mexicans counted on significant foreign assistance once at war with the U.S. The antiAnglo sentiment was not limited to Mexico; numerous Central and South American countries
pledged their assistance to Mexico. Theirs was the moral cause, and the animosity of Europe
towards the U.S. (particularly of Great Britain and France) would give them superiority. Slavery
complicated the foreign aid issue; it was widely held that lands taken by the United States would
spread the slaveholding system, further guaranteeing foreign intervention. But it was the U.S.
dispute with Britain over Oregon that seemed to clinch the issue for the Mexicans. Certainly Britain
would lend assistance to Mexico for a war with a nation that was attempting to take her territory.
Given the Mexicans' ideas, it is not surprising that they were not interested in continuing
diplomatic relations with the U.S. They wanted war, and reinforced by their pride, they provoked
the Americans into it. If they had won, Mexico would become a great nation; this was a gamble

they were willing to make.30

Richard R. Steinberg
Richard R. Steinberg accuses President Polk of deliberately bringing about the Mexican War
in "The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845," which appeared in the Pacific Historical
Review. Polk had a policy of covert aggression to bring about the War, a policy which was
engineered to shift all blame from himself. His first attempt to gain Mexican territory through
aggression was to incite Texas to conquer Mexico, and when this failed, Polk sent Slidell on a
diplomatic mission to gain redress for American claims against Mexico, a mission which he had
intended to fail.
Polk encouraged Texas to begin the conflict by pledging to uphold her territorial claims to
the Rio Grande upon annexation. The "disputed" territory between the Nueces River and the Rio
Grande was undoubtedly Mexican; Polk knew the Mexicans would defend it, as they could not
passively allow their territory to be taken away. In this manner he could incite a war without taking
the blame for it: the Mexicans would have been occupying Texan territory. To accomplish these
ends, Commodore Stockton and a number of other unofficial diplomats were sent to Texas to
encourage the war and annexation. Texas President Anson Jones among others was not eager to
begin a war to further U.S. territorial acquisition; he was satisfied when Mexico recognized Texan
independence and declared an end to the hostilities.
After failing to incite the Texans to begin the war, Polk sent Slidell on a diplomatic mission
to Mexico to gain compensation due for private American claims against Mexico. This mission was
intentionally doomed. Immediately after the annexation of Texas, Polk sent an army under Zachary
Taylor encouraged to defend the Rio Grande border. Taylor's orders were made deliberately vague
so that the blame for any hostilities could be pinned on him. However, Taylor refused to occupy the
Mexican territory west of the Nueces until explicitly ordered to do so on January 13, 1846. The
ensuing clash of arms allowed Polk to cry that "American blood had been shed on American soil,"
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and counting on the widespread popular support for the hostilities, he set out to seize northern
Mexico. Having failed in his covert operations to begin the war, Polk aggressively turned to
handling the boundary dispute as a means of furthering his expansionist policies.31

19TH CENTURY MEXICAN HISTORIANS
Ramón Alcaraz
In The Other Side: or notes for the history of the war between Mexico and the United States,
Ramón Alcaraz presents the Mexican side of the problems of the war soon after its conclusion. In a
primarily legalistic approach, Alcaraz sees ". . .the insatiable ambition of the United States, coupled
by our weakness [from inexperience in government and a constant state of revolution after
independence]. . ." as the origin of the war.32 The United States from its foundation onward sought
to expand its territory by any means, through purchase, covert operations, or outright aggression.
This national attitude was directly taken from the British, who preferred violence to subdue the
natives in their dominion. Mexico stood in the way, and the key event to the loss of its northern
territories occurred when Louisiana passed into U.S. control. From that point on, Americans
flooded into the Southwest, and with each plot of land they occupied they coveted the next.
Texas was an example of the above. A treaty of limits was passed on April 5, 1831,
reiterating the territorial limits of the 1819 Adams-Onís treaty, which nullified all U.S. claims to
Texas. [Nathan Covington Brooks calls this treaty one of amity, commerce, and navigation, and
does not mention territorial limits.] The U.S. immediately sought to subvert this treaty while the
Mexicans held it in good faith.

Immediately following the ratification of the treaty, many failed

attempts were made to purchase Texas. Then the Mexican government in an internal revolution
revoked the federal system of government in its territories, and the U.S. seized the moment to
provoke a revolution by the emigrant population in Texas. Not Mexican people in any way, either
Richard R. Steinberg, "The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845," The Pacific Historical Review 4
(1935) as reprinted in Ruiz, Mexican War, 65-76 passim.
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culturally or even politically, the Texans used the abolition of slavery and the internal revolution in
the Mexican government to justify the revolt. Probably the uprising would have occurred even if
Mexico had not revoked the federal government, because the population in Texas was almost
completely American in character.
Texan independence had to be fought, as the Mexicans could not passively allow a rebellion.
They faced Texans supplied covertly by the United States, which the entire time proclaimed its
neutrality in the affair. The diplomatic breaking point came when an army under General Gaines
was sent to occupy Mexican soil, under the pretense of protecting against Indian incursions. The
Mexican minister to the U.S. packed up and left Washington.
The Mexicans tried to let the matter blow over after Texan independence, and even when its
annexation was being argued in Congress, the most that was done was the issuing of a protest saying
that annexation would be considered as a declaration of war. It would have been just to wage war
immediately on the U.S. when it annexed what rightfully belonged to Mexico, but even this was not
done. The Mexicans kept their agreements in good faith. But the U.S. demonstrated its lack of
neutrality and its war-making desires by blockading Mexican ports and stationing troops in Mexican
territory. Mexico was within its indisputable rights in the whole affair; the United States conducted
itself unjustly through a policy of aggression.33

Carlos María de Bustamante
Bustamante, a deputy to the Mexican Congress from Oaxaca as well as a former soldier and
historian, views the Texans who rebelled against the Mexican government as ungrateful; they had
been given free land, a suspension of taxes, and the ability to conduct commerce in Mexico. With
this they happily established themselves, and Mexico did not gain anything from the colonization
process. But they rebelled and set up an independent nation of American citizens; there was not
enough time in the ten years or so from the independence of Mexico to the independence of Texas
for a generation of Texans to emerge, so those who set up independent Texas had to be United
33
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States citizens. Texas could not stand on its own as an independent nation, however; it needed
volunteers from the United States to win and maintain its independence, so it cannot be compared to
any other newly-independent nation that liberated itself and then stood under its own power.
Mexico had other complaints about the conduct of the U.S. government. Bustamante cites
an example of United States troops aiding in the Texan Revolution (General Gaines' cavalry) as a
violation of the neutrality claimed by the U.S. as well as the public organization of armies to send to
Texas in United States cities such as New Orleans. "Who, then, provoked the war-- Mexico which
only defended itself and protested [the annexation of Texas], or the United States which became
aggressors and scorned Mexico, taking advantage of its weakness and of its internecine agitations."34

20TH CENTURY MEXICAN HISTORIANS
José María Roa Bárcena
José María Roa Bárcena, in his 1902 Recuerdos de la Invasión Norteamericana, 1846-1848,
Por un Joven de Entonces, claims that "our war with the United States was the double result of
inexperience and vanity about our own capacities, on the one hand; and of an ambition
unconstrained by concepts of justice and of the abuse of force, on the other."35 Mexico's attempts to
recover Texas, both during and after its Revolution, with a poorly-equipped army from a great
distance away exhibited the inexperience of the nation. The sending of U.S. citizens to colonize
Spanish and later Mexican lands was a ". . .plan by the United States, calculated and executed
calmly and cold-bloodedly in a manner truly Saxon" to gain new territory to be added to the United
States.36 If Mexico had been prudent, she would have ceased to bother with Texas after 1835 and
Carlos María de Bustamante, El Nuevo Bernal Díaz del Castillo o Sea Historia de la Invasión de Los AngloAmericanos en México (Mexico, D.F.: Testimonios Mexicanos, Secretaría de Educación, 1949) reprinted in Cecil
Robinson, The View from Chapultepec: Mexican writers on the Mexican-American War (Tuscon, Arizona: the
University of Arizona Press, 1989), 66.
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strengthened her frontiers instead; however, this would not have prevented the annexation of the
frontier by the United States in 1848. American aggression was the root cause of the hostilities.37

Carlos Bosch García
For García, the concept of transcontinentalism was the cause of the Mexican War of 18461848; the people of the United States, ever interested in expansion, went about it in various ways
which opened one door after another until the U.S. occupied the territories once held by Mexico. By
1819, the Adams-Onís Treaty and the Louisiana Purchase had gained Florida and Louisiana; this led
to the acquisition of Texas on the Louisiana border, and the acquisition of Texas brought about the
Mexican war in 1846. Transcontinentalism was encompassed in Manifest Destiny, and this later
took on a maritime aspect as the United States occupied Cuba and the Panama Canal. It had
become a driving force in U.S. foreign policy. What is important is that the territories gained were
not gained as a result of overpopulation: the settlers had to pass through much empty land to get to
Texas (and later New Mexico and California). The expansion was the result of "the desire to
increase the power of the United States and with goals that were speculative and financial."38

Justo Sierra
Justo Sierra cites American aggression as the source of the war in Evolución Politica del
Pueblo Mexicano. However, the Mexican leaders mismanaged the war for personal gain and
prevented successful resistance. Santa Anna was the main criminal in the national betrayal.
The vehicle for the conflict was the Spanish borderlands, the sparsely-populated north of
Mexico, which the Mexicans could not hope to control once they were populated by the migrating
Americans. Mexico should have simply given Texas away, because it became almost wholly
American in composition. This was an impossibility at the time due to racism and ignorance of the
37
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effects of holding onto the province. The desire for independence on the part of the Texans was
completely understandable, as they had no ties to Mexico and every tie with the United States from
whence they came.
The U.S. policy toward Mexico was a product of the South's continual attempts to acquire
Mexican lands, seeking to spread slavery. These were done with complete disregard of Mexican
rights over her territory. The U.S. claimed part of Texas across the Nueces that had never been a
part of it, and marched troops onto Mexican lands before declaring war. Justice was with Mexico,
and every nation knew it.
But the Mexican leaders continually undermined the national cause. Santa Anna kept
agitating Texas to keep his army in the field (and therefore himself in power), a policy which led to
the Texan revolution. General Paredes was sent with the finest troops to defend the northern border
and take the offensive in Texas, but he used them to overthrow the Herrera government instead.
Santa Anna, upon his return to power, sought to regain his own glory by leading the army against
the United States. ". . .if the contending factions in Mexico had not converted the question of Texas
into a political weapon to disparage each other by mutual accusations of treason, the great calamities
could have been avoided."39 If the incontrovertible Texan independence had been recognized, the
Mexicans could have retained much of the territory that they lost.
The legacy of invading Mexico has had a disastrous effect on those who attempted it. The
Franco-Prussian War came from French intervention in Mexico, and the American Civil War arose
out of the acquisition of a vast expanse of southern land. "The war with Mexico was the school for
the future generals of the Civil War."40

Josefina Zoraida Vázquez
Josefina Vázquez considers several factors as contributors to the Mexican War. Perhaps
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most important was the expansionist movement in the nation (reflected in the elections of Andrew
Jackson and James K. Polk) and the concept of Manifest Destiny. Oregon, Texas, and California
were the main objectives of this expansionism, which was justified in many ways: it was called
biblical, and was seen as a commitment to spread the freedom and democratic government of the
United States across the land.
What also led to the breakdown of the diplomatic process was the difference in attitude that
the U.S. government held in relation to the purchase of lands in comparison to that of Mexico. The
United States had historically purchased land; Florida and Louisiana were acquired in that manner
without great hostility on the part of foreign governments. But to Mexico, the sale of land to the
United States was an unpatriotic act that would be a betrayal of the nation; therefore, the
negotiations broke down amidst a flurry of insults on both sides. Both the U.S. and Mexico then
resorted to force to settle the question.41

SOME CONCLUSION ABOUT THE MEXICAN WAR, 1846-1848
Clearly, there is no consensus on what caused the Mexican War. Manifest Destiny draws
some support as a cause, as do the expansionism of Westerners and the commercialism of
Easterners in the United States; Polk's naked aggression, general American expansionism, and the
political inexperience of Mexico are factors often referred to by the Mexican historians. The slavepower thesis provides an alternate but refutable explanation. Only Otis Singletary and Justo Sierra
give much importance to the chronic political instability in Mexico in the period from her
independence from Spain in 1821 to the outbreak of war with the United States in 1846. This
political instability that Mexico suffered from after independence was not unique; other newlyindependent Latin-American nations shared a similar fate.
Simón Bolívar in his famous "Jamaica Letter" gives an explanation for the occurrence of
political instability that plagued Latin American nations after they attained their independence.
Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, Mexicanos y Norteamericanos ante la Guerra del 47 (Mexico, D.F.: Secretaría de
Educación Pública, 1972) reprinted in Cecil Robinson, The View from Chapultepec: Mexican writers on the MexicanAmerican War (Tucson, Arizona: the University of Arizona Press, 1989), 196-209 passim.
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Spain's monarchy held absolute sway over the colonies in the New World; her American subjects
were not allowed participatory government, even if that participation was under the thumb of the
King as subordinate administrators.42 Instead, Spaniards were sent to the colonies to govern them,
precluding any legitimacy for American rulers-- even autocratic ones-- and setting up fertile ground
for the success of revolutions.43 Liberal, constitutional republics like the one maintained in the
United States were unsuited to Latin America because, unlike the people of the United States, Latin
Americans lacked the experience and political virtues to sustain them in proper equilibrium. 44 Such
a liberal government, based on the equality of man and liberty for all, was installed in Mexico
through the Constitution of 1824.
In addition to the adoption of the Constitution of 1824 and the lack of legitimacy for any
native Mexican ruler, other factors led to post-independence political instability for Mexico. The
army that won her independence remained involved in politics and became a tool for political
leaders to enter office.45 And while the more conservative elements in Mexican society wanted no
social change, liberal elements sought socioeconomic reorganization.46 The alternation of power
between the two groups with the army always in the middle was a hallmark of the period before the
Mexican War.
It was this Mexican political instability in the period from independence until 1846 that was
a significant factor in provoking the Mexican War. In fact, of all of the Presidents of Mexico
between her independence in 1821 and 1844, only the first one, Guadalupe Victoria, was able to
serve out a full four-year term in office.47 Some of the often-cited causes of the Mexican War have
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their origin in the endemic political instability that Mexico suffered from after she achieved her
independence from Spain. Perhaps the most important of these is the Texan Revolution and later
the annexation of Texas into the United States. President Johnson wrote that the admission of
Texas into the Union was the cause for Mexico's initiating war.48
Under the liberal Constitution of 1824, the Mexican Congress passed the Federal
Colonization Law, which allowed foreigners to colonize Mexico. The settlers were given large
tracts of land: colonists received up to a league in Texas, and up to eleven leagues in California.49
These tracts were offered to settlers, mostly American, because of the unpopulated nature of
Mexico's frontier. The colonists accepted them in spite of having to become Roman Catholic
citizens of Mexico, and they began participating in the federalist democracy.50 But the situation at
home in Mexico was not stable; the elections of 1833 would spell the death of the participatory
democracy enjoyed by the Americans in Texas.
Antonio López de Santa Anna won the elections of 1833 under liberal auspices, and after
discovering that being the President was dull, he turned power over to his Vice-President, Gómez
Farías, and returned to his estate in Veracruz.51 The liberal Farías, not surprisingly, enacted
antimilitary and anticlerical reforms in keeping with his ideology.

He shrank the army and

abolished the fueros, which had kept military men from being subject to civil law. And in debasing
the clergy, he attempted to secularize education (including closing the completely clerical University
of Mexico); he declared the government's right to assign all clerical positions; he assumed control of
the Californian Franciscan missions and put them under secular auspices; and most importantly, he
abolished the mandatory tithe.52 The conservatives (traditionally the hacendados, the clergy, and the
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Tennessee: the University of Tennessee Press, 1967), 362-3.
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military) reacted vehemently and sought to topple the government. And who would be their
champion but the same Antonio López de Santa Anna who had been elected as a liberal? Santa
Anna led a coup and repudiated all of the measures taken by Farías, setting up a regime that "was
openly conservative, Catholic, and centralist."53
Santa Anna then revoked the Constitution of 1824 and supplanted it with the Siete Leyes, a
centralist document that allowed the central government to assign regional leaders and put income
requirements on voting and election into political office.54 Because of this shift in constitutions, the
Texans were deprived of the local autonomy that they had enjoyed (which was similar to the selfgovernment allowed to a state in the United States), and they began a revolution to get free. 55 The
Texan Revolution began on October 2, 1835, as a rebellion not against Mexico but against the
Centralist, Santa Anna-led dictatorship and the "abrogation of the Constitution."56 Though the
Texans won their independence and Santa Anna recognized it, later Presidents of Mexico denied the
treaty of recognition.57 This would prove to be a mistake; Roa Bárcena wrote that "Mexico, if it
were to have acted with prevision and wisdom, should have written off Texas in 1835 while
fastening onto itself and fortifying its new frontiers. It should have recognized as an accepted fact
the independence of that colony and, by way of negotiations, should have resolved any differences
and settled boundary questions with the United States."58 Instead, by 1842 Santa Anna had made
two small military intrusions into Texas, inflaming the possibility of the outbreak of war.59
When Texas was annexed by the United States, Juán Almonte, the Mexican minister to the
U.S., left the country proclaiming that the "joint resolution [to annex Texas] was tantamount to a
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declaration of war;" however, he had expected to lose his position soon, as he was a centralist
appointed by Santa Anna, who had since fallen from power. 60 In ending negotiations between the
two governments, he hoped to discredit the new Herrera government by confronting the United
States.61 Unfortunately, the ending of negotiations also complicated a diplomatic resolution to the
conflict.
Herrera wanted to settle the question over Texas without going to war, but Texas did not
accept his offer of peace with Mexico because they had already decided on annexation into the
United States by July 1845 (the Mexican proposal included a proviso that Texas would not seek to
be annexed by the U.S.). Amidst opposition from many who wanted war, Herrera then sent word to
the U.S. that his government would accept someone to resolve the problems between the two
nations; this someone was John Slidell.62 However, Herrera could not recognize Slidell as an
"Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary" without fear of falling from power upon
Slidell's arrival in Mexico.63 Both Herrera and his successor, Paredes, told the United States
government that ". . .it had been agreed to receive only a ‘commissioner’ empowered to adjust
outstanding disputes, not a regular minister plenipotentiary to resume diplomatic relations before
everything was settled."64 In December of 1845, however, General Mariano Paredes took over the
government, gaining support by insisting that Texas be reclaimed, violently if necessary.65
"Centralists [Paredes]. . .used annexation to overthrow the Herrera government and to work large
segments of the Mexican population into a war fever."66 Paredes then immediately began preparing
60
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for war.67
Paredes believed that Mexico could win the war. Granted, many things were in Mexico's
apparent favor: her troops were seasoned and well-equipped; the army of the United States was only
one-quarter the size of Mexico's; and aid was expected from Great Britain due to the conflict
between the United States and Britain over Oregon.68 In contrast, the American army was filled
with volunteers whose combat worthiness was in question, and since Texas was so far from centers
of population and supply, logistical support would be difficult (especially for an American army
inside Mexico). In addition, Paredes expected the Northern abolitionists in the U.S. to oppose the
war and thereby ruin morale. He even went so far as to expect Indians to fight on the side of
Mexico and slaves to rebel in the South.69

However, the Mexican generals making these

assumptions were not chosen on the basis of their generalship. Fransisco Bulnes, describing the
situation of the Mexican army in 1830, said that because of a fear of falling out of power, presidents
would not appoint any general with a good military reputation; such a man would be humiliated if
he allowed the president to direct his activities.70 As a result, presidents did whatever they could to
prevent the development of good military leadership and instead focused on having the generals be
their own minions: ". . .the Presidents Bustamante and Santa Anna demanded of their army chiefs
that they be first of all followers of Bustamante or Santa Anna, although they might at the same time
have been cowardly or inept."71 The outcome was that only unfit men were given the top military
positions.72
Political instability not only worked against a peaceful resolution of the conflict over Texas;
67

Ibid., 28.

68

Ibid.

69

Ibid., 29.

Fransisco Bulnes, Las Grandes Mentiras de Nuestra Historia (Mexico, D.F.: Librería de la Vda DE C.H. BOURET,
1904) reprinted in Robinson, View from Chapultepec, 122.
70

71

Ibid.

72

Ibid., 123.

it caused and then made difficult the diplomatic resolution of the issue of claims made against the
Mexican government by American citizens.

After Mexico gained her independence, she

experienced political chaos resulting in an almost constant array of pronunciamientos against the
government; these uprisings and conflicts many times destroyed the property of aliens living in
Mexico.73 Foreign governments, seeking collection on the claims their people made against the
Mexican government, sometimes skirted diplomatic means to do so. During the time between the
closing of the American embassy in Mexico at the end of 1836 and its reopening in 1839, both
Britain and France had sent military missions to pressure the Mexicans into settling claims their
citizens had made against the Mexican government.74
Many other claims arose from Mexican violations of the April 5, 1831, "treaty of amity,
commerce, and navigation" (which was ratified later) between Mexico and the United States. 75 For
example, in 1836 Mexico barred aliens from settling in her frontier areas, thus violating the treaty;
in an 1840 enforcement of this law some Americans were detained in California.76 And in 1843,
Santa Anna ended almost all trade with the U.S. and barred aliens from conducting any retail trade
in Mexico, again abrogating the earlier treaty.77
In 1836, the centralist Mexican minister to the U.S., Manuel Gorostiza, left the country
accusing the U.S. of aiding the Texans during their revolution; however, for the previous eight years
President Jackson had been trying unsuccessfully to get the Mexican governments to pay the money
they owed to American citizens.78 Connor and Faulk write that "one may suspect that Gorostiza's
diatribe against the United States was motivated in part by the impasse over the claims."79 The
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previous federalist government in Mexico had been responsible for many of the claims, and the
centralist government that Gorostiza served under was in power.80
The United States attempted arbitration rather than force to settle the claims its citizens
made against the Mexican government, and arranged for Baron Roenne, a Prussian, to arbitrate a
convention with the centralist government of Mexico.81 After the eighteen months had run out for
deliberation in 1842, $2,026,139.68 was granted to the claimants ($4,265,464.90 was not even
addressed for lack of time).82 The collection of this amount was difficult. A second convention was
held on January 30, 1843, to assure Mexico's payment of the money owed, but "Mexico paid only
the interest due on the 30th of April, 1843, and three of the twenty instalments [sic] of the
principal;" a third convention to discuss the remainder of the claims began on November 20, 1843,
but bogged down because the Mexican government did not respond to whether it would accept the
amendments to the convention that the United States Senate ratified.83 Santa Anna, back in the
presidential chair after overthrowing the government that agreed to have the convention originally,
refused to complete his obligation to pay.84 By July 1844, because of the furor over Texas, the
Mexican press began to criticize the Mexican government for agreeing to the remittance of claims,
and applied pressure to stop payment altogether.85
Mexican political instability contributed heavily in causing the problems between Mexico
and Texas, and it exacerbated the tension between Mexico and the United States by preventing a
satisfactory diplomatic solution to the claims that the Mexican government owed the United States.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo included not only the settlement once and for all about Texas, but
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it also provided a resolution of the claims owed by Mexico to citizens of the United States.86 Given
the absence of political instability in Mexico and the accompanying problems, the Mexican War of
1846-1848 might not have happened.
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